To Condone or Not to Condone? The Curious Case of Bureaucratic Delay as a Sufficient Cause

[Mansi is a student at Hidayatullah National Law University.]

In the world of justice, time is often the villain, much like the sands in an hourglass, slipping away relentlessly. “All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given to us,” Gandalf said wisely in The Lord of the Rings. Yet, in the world of litigation, time often appears as an unheeded gift, especially when bureaucratic delay turns justice into a waiting game. The laws of limitation are founded on public policy, in order to prevent the cruelty of long dormant claims. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 (Act) provides for a discretionary power to the courts to condone the delays, as a matter of concession, if a party provides a “sufficient cause” that hindered them from filing the appeal or application on time. 

The laws of limitation are meant to bring disputes to a timely conclusion. But what happens when the largest litigant the government treats these limits as suggestions rather than strict boundaries? In the name of public interest, courts have condoned the delay of state parties citing the challenges of red tape and systemic inefficiency. These reasons were readily accepted by courts and thus, state parties increasingly began to invoke this argument as a basis for seeking condonation of delay. A close analysis of all the cases where this argument has been made, reveals two competing lines of precedent and neither of them has overruled the other. 

In a recent judgement delivered in December 2024, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Kumar Choudhary (Ram Kumar), the Supreme Court (SC) refused to condone the delay of the state party citing its callous attitude. In light of the same, this piece examines the tug-of-war between two strings of case law: the one taking an empathetic view of the red-tapism that exists, and the other demanding accountability, emphasizing that systemic inefficiency should not be an excuse for neglecting the timely pursuit of justice.

Judicial Latitude for State Parties 

The lenient approach of the courts while dealing with state parties can be traced back to Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji given by the SC. Taking a sympathetic view towards government entities, the court acknowledged the impersonal machinery and bureaucratic delays. While the SC justified its approach by emphasizing the collective cause of the community, it inadvertently opened the floodgates for future prayers for condonation based solely on the inefficiencies inherent in governmental machinery. 

Relying on this, the Andhra High Court, in Government of AP v. Sathaiah, attributing the entire delay “institutional”, went on to list down factors which the courts are “bound” to consider while adjudging such cases. Further, the SC’s judgement in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Others, relying on the same, condoned the delay on grounds of “impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology.”

The Paradox of Unequal Treatment

Condonation of delay being a discretionary power, the party has to explain “sufficient cause” while praying for the same. While there are no fixed criteria for granting it, delays caused by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides are generally not excused. The analysis of the above judgments evinces the paradoxical approach adopted by the courts. 

These judgments begin by explicitly acknowledging that government parties are to be treated no differently from private litigants. However, they then proceed to justify granting condonation on grounds such as impersonal machinery, bureaucratic delays, and red-tapism, factors deemed sufficient in the interest of justice. 

Problems with Accepting Bureaucratic Delay as Sufficient Cause 

Accepting bureaucratic delays as a sufficient cause is problematic for two primary reasons: first, bureaucratic inefficiency and red-tapism are intrinsic to the functioning of governmental bodies and cannot be considered a valid “cause,” let alone be a “sufficient” one. The explanation of being a government department is more of an excuse than an explanation. Second, it would not be an exaggeration to state that bureaucratic delay itself often arises from negligence or deliberate inaction, thereby failing to meet the threshold for grant of condonation. While Section 5 of the Act allows for judicial discretion, granting excessive latitude to government parties, who bear a higher responsibility to act diligently, sets a troubling precedent that prioritizes excuses over accountability.

Parallel Line of Judicial Reasoning: Towards Accountability?

The judiciary's approach to condoning delays caused by bureaucratic inefficiency reflects a persistent tension between empathy for systemic challenges and the demand for accountability. An analysis of judicial trends reveals a persistent dilemma regarding the extent to which bureaucratic delays should be treated as sufficient cause for condonation.

In Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, delay of 264 days in filing the SLP was refused to be condoned, noting the limits to the argument of “proverbial red tape.” The principle was further followed in Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) By LRS v. Exe. Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project & Another (Pundlik) wherein the SC, setting aside High Court’s order to condone a delay of 1,724 days, ruled that the law of limitation is the same for citizens and governmental authorities. Similarly, in Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited, an application for the condonation of delay of 427 days in filing an SLP was dismissed, warning against the anticipated benefit for government departments. 

In the 2020 case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal (Bherulal), the court strongly criticized bureaucratic inefficiency and refused to condone a 663-day delay going so far as to suggest that if government machinery is incapable of adhering to limitation periods, a separate extended timeline for filing might as well be established for government authorities. 

Analyzing the Shift towards Judicial Discipline 

The second line of cases represent a stricter approach that clarifies the need for accountability and reinforces the idea that delays caused by bureaucratic inefficiency should not be condoned as a matter of course. Another commendable aspect of the second stream of cases has been that the courts have explicitly rejected the argument of “special leeway to government entities,” since it would result in setting a wrong precedent. In Ram Kumar, the SC not only refused to condone a delay of 1,788 days on part of the Government but also imposed costs, citing the callous attitude of the state machinery. 

In fact, the SC in Pundlik made a pertinent observation, noting that the State cannot claim to have a separate period of limitation when the department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology cannot be accepted in view of the “modern technologies being used and available”. This was also resonated in the Bherulal case, that a greater leeway made sense only in times when the technology has not advanced. In times when a single click makes all communications possible, explanations of slow-paced movement of files should rather be deemed as an excuse rather than a cause. 

However, a deviation from this stricter stance can be seen in two recent cases, State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang (Koting Lamkang) and Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (Sheo Raj Singh). In both these cases, the SC condoned delays citing bureaucratic inefficiency. Although, it is also pertinent to note that both these cases had certain peculiarities to it which distinguishes it from normal cases of bureaucratic delay. Koting Lamkang involved issues of strategic and national importance, and hence reliance on bureaucratic inefficiency was not the only ground. 

Recognizing the existence of two competing judicial approaches, the court, in Sheo Raj Singh, refrained from interfering with the High Court’s grant of condonation, citing “no error warranting interference”, since it was sitting in appeal. Notably, the court also observed that while some rulings have denied condonation on similar grounds, they have never explicitly overruled earlier judgments granting relief, thereby leaving room for continued judicial discretion in such matters. 

The Public Interest Argument 

While intent behind accepting bureaucratic delays as a “sufficient cause” is to protect the larger public interest, condoning delays based solely on the magnitude of public interest is a dangerous precedent, effectively granting unrestricted relief to state parties under the guise of representing the public cause. Applications for condonation of delay should not be automatically accepted on the grounds that dismissing the case due to limitation would harm public interest. 

As highlighted in Pundlik, it is very much in public interest that settled rights should not be disturbed by either party unless there is an element of fraud in the action of parties. It is also not necessary that public interest be always represented by the state parties. For instance, in University of Delhi v. Union of India, the SC refusing to condone the delay of over 900 days, while specifically noting that condoning delay would harm public interest since one of the respondents had received large amounts of money do not serve the public interest in any way. 

Conclusion

The absence of any explicit overruling of earlier judgments which granted leniency to state parties left room for conflicting interpretations. To strike a balance between justice and accountability, there was a pressing need for clarity on the scope of sufficient cause in cases involving government delays. 

The Ram Kumar judgement provides a much needed clarity in this regard. It not only sets definitive standards for how discretion under Section 5 should be exercised but also delves into the public policy concerns arising from the second order effects of routinely allowing state parties to claim the defence of bureaucratic delays. Aligning with recent rulings emphasizing accountability, it also introduces novel aspects that warrant closer scrutiny. Introducing a new layer of individual accountability within government litigation, the court in this case issued an explicit directive to the state to penalize responsible officials for delays and streamline its legal processes. The ruling also reaffirms that public interest cannot serve as a default justification for condonation, thereby narrowing the scope of arguments available to state entities. 

By penalizing officials responsible for delays, the judgment may shape future rulings to hold bureaucratic inefficiency to a stricter standard. The ruling also signals a shift from merely criticizing bureaucratic inertia to actively compelling institutional reforms, to ensure greater efficiency in government litigation.